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Jostling for Space in Africa’s Business Periphery: A Review of the Growing
Competition Between Indigenous and Chinese-Owned Enterprises 1
Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa

(Zziyika and Associates LLC, SAIPAR)

This paper reviews recent research and related studies on the ongoing competition
between Chinese and local entrepreneurs in the lower rungs of Africa’s business sector.
Several studies have noted that since entry, Chinese firms have been able to undercut
African entrepreneurs, thanks to superior networks and better financing. However,
other findings portray more positive impacts of Chinese presence, including higher
employment and tax revenues, and better supply of goods and services. It is possible to
surmise that this jostling for space in Africa’s business periphery will not last.
Ultimately, it must yield to changes in the host countries’ political economy and market
environments.
I. Introduction

1.1.
Purpose
This paper is a review of studies on the impact of Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa's
business periphery. It seeks clarity on several aspects of the Africa-China debate. Given
that they compete directly with local firms, while at the same time providing
employment and other amenities to people at that level, what is the impact of Chinese
businesses on local welfare? Are they contributing to Africa’s development i.e. the “winwin” postulated in official pronouncements or is the continent, as often alleged, merely a
means to Chinese entrenchment? The review also examines the extent to which the
heightened criticism of China's presence in Africa, including charges of racism and neocolonialism, is to blame on geopolitics, notably those emanating from the West's fear of
a resurgent China. Finally, it assesses how much of the ongoing debate should be of
concern to Africa’s policymakers as they craft strategies for sustainable development.

1.2.
The Africa-China Debate: De Ja Vu
Although China was once a poor and famine-prone country, its global emergence in
recent decades has been a source of much inspiration and hope for Africa and the rest of
the Third World i.e., with the message that “poverty is not destiny.” In turn, Africa-China
relations have taken center stage in the geopolitical discourse, notably in the West,
where the view seems to be that the Chinese are wielding undue economic and political
1

Work on this paper commenced while I was still attached (as visiting fellow) to the Institute for African
Development at Cornell University. A version of the paper was presented at the African Business Conference
held at Universite' Laval, Quebec, 18-21 May 2022. I thank Prof. Issouf Soumare for the invitation.
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influence on the African continent, but without clear-cut strategies to countervail it
(Hanauer and Morris, 2014; Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009).

Indeed, with somewhat resonant analogy, French (2015) sees Africa as China’s second
continent, where upwards of a million migrants are building a wholly new empire. The
latter, although an exaggeration, has resonance in some quarters in Africa and beyond
(Haugen and Carling 2005; Konde 2018; Los Angeles Times 2017; Marysse and Geenen
2007/8).
In discussing China’s role in Africa’s development, the focus has tended to dwell on the
People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s unprecedented investment in the continent’s
infrastructure—airports, bridges, dams, internet infrastructure, ports, power
evacuation lines and systems, railways, and roads, its reputedly insatiable demand for
natural resources (oil, coal, copper, rare earths, gold etc.), and its “scorched-earth”
approach to dominating the continent’s consumer market. But the impact is proving to
be much broader, touching on the political economy of the host countries, the regional
context, sector transformation, and global ramifications, while also reflecting push
factors in China itself (ACORD 2016; Airault 2007; Liu 2013; Mhango 2019; Ngwa 2019;
Weng et. al. 2018; Driessen 2016).

Some authors have argued that despite the broad and sometimes acrimonious AfricaChina debate, China’s wish to assert itself and capture markets is not exceptional in the
broader context of geopolitics and global market dominance (Hanlon 2017; Tull 2006).
In previous decades, the West went through pretty much the same strategic moves as it
sought to assert its power i.e. build infrastructure in its spheres of influence to open up
countries for trade; and provide support to allied developing countries through
concessionary trade credits and project finance, while encouraging own multinationals
to play a leading role in project implementation.
However, many studies have noted that in spite of China’s geopolitical and market
imperatives in Africa, the true legacy of its presence there might lie more at the human
than the technical level. This is because the subtext of China’s state-led investment in
Africa is the migration and employment of upwards of a million Chinese individuals,
their families, and networks, to the continent in the previous two decades, and the
impact that has had on individual countries (Gu 2009; Huang 2013; Park and Chen
2009). 2
Although the presence of large numbers of Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa’s business
sector is largely taken for granted today, the seemingly logical outcome of decades of
extensive Chinese infrastructure construction in Africa, it was nevertheless
unprecedented in terms of numbers, the short time it took to put in place, and its
potential economic and political implications (Postel 2017; Yuan San 2015).
Previous waves of foreign immigration into Africa, such as those of Indian or Pakistani

2

Li (2010) has put it succinctly in the introduction to his case study of Chinese investors in Zambia’s
Copperbelt: “we should make sense of the connection between certain Chinese activities and the political
economy of local society in Africa, connect Chinese dynamics to the African context and analyze the Chinese
presence in well-grounded contexts.”
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citizens in East Africa or Syrians and Lebanese in West Africa, were of a decidedly
different pattern and intensity (Saldanha 2013; Jones 2007). These earlier migrant
groups had had a longer period to entrench themselves during the colonial period and
had achieved an uncontested claim on the breadth of the business sector, including
small shops in the villages i.e., dukawallah.
Post-independence, migrants were squeezed out of the lower echelons of the business
sectors, leading in cases to remigration, while their larger companies were nationalized
in places such as Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. These moves were referred to by the
socialist-leaning governments of the time as marching towards “economic
independence”—the implication was that only political independence had been
achieved thus far.

The causes of recent Chinese migration to Africa have been different from those of the
past (Biggeri and Sanfilippo 2009). However, lacking robust frameworks for futures
planning and scenarios analyses, few governments in Africa can adequately assess the
impacts of Chinese immigration. Fewer still have endeavoured to analyse what the
socioeconomic impact of Chinese investment, including on debt accumulation, the
environment, and general social welfare, would have on their development.
Researchers argue that if, as in the case of previous waves of immigration, local African
entrepreneurs are simply displaced by the new Chinese entrants, either for lack of
superior networks or owing to the latter’s cultural hegemony, not much learning or
transfer of technology will take place, and a unique opportunity for the Chinese
diaspora to contribute to Africa’s development would have been lost (Oonk 2013;
Spring and Jiao 2008).
1.3.
Outline of the Review
This review of the literature on the impact of Chinese entrepreneurship in the micro,
small and medium enterprise segments of Africa’s business sector draw on published
academic research, mainly from the social sciences, country studies commissioned by
international organizations and NGOs, and some media reports and analyses.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 looks at some of the contradictions
inherent in China’s promotion of Africa’s development and its private citizen’s search
for livelihoods in Africa’s business sectors, especially at the lowest levels. Chapter 3
discusses differences in performance between Chinese and local entrepreneurs. Chapter
4 concludes the review.
II. China in Africa’s Business: Inevitable Contradictions

2.1. The Political Economy of Chinese Presence
Several studies have argued that the competition between Chinese and indigenous
businesses has important consequences for host countries’ political economy. The “new
kids on the block” are competing directly with local entrepreneurs for business projects
of similar size and sector description i.e., restaurants, groceries, commodity trading,
artisanal mining, agricultural production, poultry, house construction, hotels and guest
houses, money lending, fish mongering, “natural” medicine, hawking, and selling old
7

clothes etc.

Chinese entry has had both positive (i.e., better supply of goods and services,
employment opportunities, higher revenues) and negative effects (i.e., displacement of
local entrepreneurs, erosion of urban safety nets). The informal sector can no longer be
relied upon to be a safety valve for the urban economy (Geerts, Xinwa and Rossouw
2014; Xiao 2015).
In the retail sector, the loss of customers to the more efficient Chinese operators, with
their vast import networks, has caused much resentment among indigenous traders—
with threats of boycotts—leading in cases to violent incidents, and the intervention of
the authorities 3 (Mungai 2019; Wonacott 2012).
2.2.
Muddled Nomenclature: “Win-Win” versus Global Imperatives
Africa-China relations, while steeped in storied historical links and alliances, have had
to adapt in recent decades to changing global imperatives—including the global political
and economic rise of the PRC (Alden and Chichava 2014; Cao 2013).
African leaders have been enthused by China’s “tripod of historical legitimacies” which
posit that a shared past of colonial domination requires both South-South cooperation
and the development of alternative-minded development strategies i.e., the
developmental state, promotion of industrial development, mutual benefit and
upholding the principle of self-determination. These ambitions have been reiterated in
the One-Belt-One-Road approach that has been rolled out by China in recent years.

In turn, African countries have looked to China to champion their causes in the UN and
other international institutions, and more recently financing the continent’s
infrastructure push. Regular China-Africa meetings have been held at heads of state
levels to discuss relations and plot the road ahead.
On its part, at least in policy pronouncements, China considers Africa to be an important
geopolitical partner, a key ally in the global power play (at the UN 4 and similar forums
for example) and, given the continent’s ongoing demographic transition, a future
growth pole for the world. It is not surprising that Africa-China relations have been
referred to by both sides as “win-win.”

Still, the massive entry of Chinese entrepreneurs into Africa 5, as has happened in the
last two decades, was bound to muddle the waters and unleash an avalanche of less
3

The Mail and Guardian (January 25, 2015) observed that anti-immigrant violence was quite common in Africa,
with Somalis being attacked in Nairobi and Soweto, and Chinese in Congo and Zambia, a result of poor
economic times in host economies.
4
For example, in pursuit of a major foreign policy plank, the One China Policy, PRC has in recent decades
managed to get all African countries, excepting Eswatini, to abandon their recognition of Taiwan in favour of
Mainland China.
5
This was more in the realm of “unintended consequences” i.e. emanating from the loosening of policies around
private entrepreneurship and international travel back in China during the late 1990s than of systematic policies
design by PRC. Some studies (Driessen 2016) have argued, however, that since Deng Xiaoping’s opening-up
policy of the late 1970s, encouraging outward Chinese migration has been at the center of the country’s overall
economic policy thrust, with emigration helping to find livelihoods for thousands of displaced rural dwellers,
and later softening the blow of structural transformation that had led to losses of industrial jobs.
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than complimentary responses: charges that the Chinese were displacing locals in
business ventures, increased dependence on Chinese imports, de-industrialization in
Africa, domestic deference to Chinese global policies, and loss of “self-determination,”
contradicting an important rider of Africa-China relations (Chan 2013a, 2013b; Zi
2015).

In explaining China’s long-lived relations with Africa, the example of the two thousandkilometre TAZARA railway project embarked on from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to the
Zambian border is often given (New York Times, 1971). However, it also gives an
example of a different China during that time. In contrast to today, the Chinese builders
of the TAZARA railway returned home en masse, while many workers on today’s
Chinese infrastructure projects chose to remain behind i.e. the push and pull factors are
completely different (French, 2015; Jayaram, Kassiri and Yuan San 2017).
It is also instructive that in the 40 years since the TAZARA railway was built, China has
become a global power, while Tanzania and Zambia remain relatively underdeveloped.
In spite official claims to the contrary, China and its Africa partners were not equal
partners then and are much less so now—in these circumstances, “mutual benefit” as a
concept is illusory (Chan 2013a).

Given, in addition, China’s ubiquitous financing of African infrastructure, researchers,
opposition parties and other stakeholders are now tendentiously talking about the rise
of Chinese neo-colonialism in Africa (French 2015). It is also insightful that thinktanks
in the West have taken lively interest in the China-Africa debate, although emphasizing
the policy duplicity of China as an emerging global power has a false tone to it (Hanauer
and Morris 2014).
Allusions to China’s hegemonic ambitions aside, Chan et. al. (2013) have noted that, in
spite lofty official protestations 6, Africa is only a cog in the wheel of China’s global
economic ambition and thrust. Chinese FDI to Africa, as a percentage of the total, has
fluctuated in the lower single digits in the past decade. Most African countries have a
large trade deficit with China, in spite substantial exports of African raw materials to the
country, including oil. Total China-Africa trade comprises only about 4% of Chinese
trade with the world.

Some researchers have charged that in spite Africa’s small size in China’s trade
relations, the continent has become a convenient dumping ground for leftover products
i.e., not good enough for the West, including polluting technologies, and sub-standard
products. Further that the continent has become a staging point for the export of China’s
excess labor, not the most skilled, shed by the country’s modernizing manufacturing
sector (Driessen, 2016) 7.

6

See for example the article in the People’s Daily, February 16, 2012 entitled: “Chinese investments in Africa
cement friendly ties.”
7
“Get out” pressures in China have included rising labor costs, industrial overcrowding, cutthroat competition,
more stringent environment legislation etc. It is no longer as easy to make it from scratch for relatively young
people as in the past. Many young Chinese have been forced to seek their fortune elsewhere.
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However, there is a danger in generalities. Research by Mckinsey, the consultancy
company (Jayaram, Kassiri, and Yuan San, 2017), suggests that Chinese engagement
with African countries could be divided in four distinct types: robust partners (for
example Ethiopia and South Africa); solid partners (i.e., Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania);
unbalanced partners (i.e., Angola, Zambia); and nascent partners (Cote d’Ivoire, DRC).
Hence, and not surprisingly, the type of official engagement enjoyed by China with
African countries impacts the nature of relations that Chinese entrepreneurs enjoy at
the local level (Hellendorff 2011).
2.3.

African Policy Responses

Generally, domestic groups not linked to the ruling parties, including labour unions,
trade associations and NGOs, have, often opportunistically, been critical of how African
governments have dealt with China (Tang 2017). They note that the Africa-China
relationship is asymmetrical, pointing especially at the lack of transparency in the
infrastructure and resource extraction deals, including payment terms, and their
implications for debt sustainability.

Few African governments have attempted to respond directly to their critics, but also
significantly few are backing away from what has so far proven to be a useful means of
pushing Africa’s development agenda forward with Chinese support.
However, given the rising level of domestic disgruntlement directed at aspects of
Chinese presence, some governments have taken steps in areas of immediate concern,
especially those posing social unrest. For example, on the issue of Chinese displacement
of local entrepreneurs from profitable segments of the informal sector and SMEs, some
African governments have issued new regulations targeted at restricting foreign entry
(in some cases targeted directly at new Chinese businesses) at the lower end of the
private sector distribution. In areas such as hair-saloons, eateries (other than Chinese
restaurants), and retail shops, foreign participation has been banned altogether. 8
In several cases, notably Cameron, Kenya, and Nigeria, African governments have
sought to strengthen immigration and investment permit processing procedures, but
bureaucratic shortcomings and corruption have deterred progress (Gadzala, 2019;
Ngwa 2019; Liu 2019). Thus, while investment permits are issued on the promise of
millions of dollars of new projects, with investors often allotted land by the Government
for their proposed businesses, few of them actually take off. A survey of ongoing private
investment in Uganda (Bank of Uganda, 2018) has indicated that several foreign
investors initially designated as manufacturers and potential exporters had
surreptitiously reverted to retail trading and importing.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the support of African governments
for Chinese investment is fading. In Uganda, for example, the Government has allocated
8

Angola is illustrative in this regard. See Herculano Coroado and Joe Brock “Angolans resentful as China
tightens its grip,” World News, Reuters, July 8, 2015.
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parts of its military assets to guarding Chinese entrepreneurs (Reuters 2018)—the
latter were concerned with the seemingly targeted robberies that Chinese companies
have encountered in recent years. In Senegal, the authorities continued to support
Chinese presence in the country, seeing it as a balancing act to Lebanese businesses, for
example (Cissé 2013).
A broader question posed by some of the studies is whether African policymakers are
drawing the right lessons from the Chinese miracle that they so admire (Huang 2013,
Mazimhaka 2013; Ross, Omar, and Xu 2019).

While the Chinese model was not perfect, studies nevertheless point out that the
Chinese miracle was partly based on staggered controls in the business sector, strategic
allocation of both foreign exchange and domestic credit, and constrained foreign firm
access to strategic sectors of the economy—especially at the lower levels of the business
sector.
In China, strong institutions, including at the sub-national levels, were crucial for policy
implementation, accountability, and the promotion of an effective regulatory
environment. Good planning was key for the success of government strategies, and poor
performance was sanctioned i.e., policymakers sought policy coherence.

They argue that while today Chinese entrepreneurs compete “freely” against indigenous
entrepreneurs in many African countries, such a scenario would have been
inconceivable in China during the earlier phases of its industrialization, when foreign
entry was virtually barred. However, these lessons on “how China made it” do not
appear to have been absorbed to any large extent by African policymakers.
III. Jostling for Space in the Business Periphery

3.1.
Chinese versus African: Superior Networks or Cultural Hegemony?
The studies reviewed underline that while China, the state, might be pursuing
nondescript geopolitical ambitions with its African investment, its private citizens are in
Africa principally to make money (Alden and Chichava 2014; Brautigam 2003; Liu
2013).

The big argument being made in favor of increased Chinese engagement in African
business is that they have been able to flourish, in spite the litany of structural and
policy impediments including lack of foreign exchange, inputs, and technical skills.
However, sceptics have charged that complaints about skills and work habits are simply
excuses for Chinese firms to import Chinese labor (Men 2014; Van Djik and
Warmerdam 2012; Gu 2009; Dollar 2016).
On the other hand, local entrepreneurs blame their difficulties on unfair competition,
lack of access to credit, and official policies that favor foreign than domestic investors
(Xia 2019).
Zambia’s Copperbelt provides a microcosm of the experience of Chinese entrepreneurs
in negotiating their way into urban strongholds in Africa, in the face of political
11

disaffection and worker discontent in host countries (Elcoate 2018; Hairong and
Sautman 2013; Konde 2018; Negi 2008; Wonacott 2012). As in other parts of Africa,
Chinese presence on the Copperbelt, and Zambia more generally, has conjured tales,
some quite contrived, of indigenous entrepreneur marginalization and labor
casualization (Lee 2009). For example, the fact that a substantial portion of the
burgeoning sovereign debt is owed to state agencies from the PRC has set off rumors
that key infrastructure assets such as the electricity parastatal (ZESCO) and the new
airport are at risk of annexation by China, an implausible outcome but one broadly
believed by swathes of the population. Similarly, some domestic pressure groups, with
little pretense to accuracy, have argued that large patches of land are being bought for
the construction of exclusive communities for new Chinese migrants etc. (Zambian
Watchdog, 2018). These protestations might not be sufficient to shift public policy in
Zambia but indicate that the embrace of Chinese entrepreneurs at the periphery levels
of the economy will be recalcitrant and divisive.

However, in a study of what influences local attitudes to Chinese businesses on the
Copperbelt, Li (2010) blames the overt hostility, charges, and myths on a general lack of
understanding, especially in the West, of the type of engagement that China is seeking
with Africa. Chinese investors on Zambia’s Copperbelt, he argues, are there for the long
haul, trying to make a real difference in the region and the country. In spite of this, and
owing to an inherent bias against anything Chinese, firms from the PRC are more apt to
be criticized locally for shortcomings than their counterparts from the West. According
to Li (2010), these biases explain to a large extent why efforts by Chinese firms to
respond to both workplace and environmental concerns in recent years have not been
appreciated by their detractors.
3.2.

Impact on Local Businesses

Recent estimates indicate that there might be up to 1 million Chinese residents in Africa,
mainly engaged in entrepreneurial activities of one type or the other. Between 20002014, there was a total of some 10,000 Chinese-owned and operated companies on the
continent (designated, from the Chinese point of view, as national, provincial, municipal,
and private) (Feng and Pilling, 2019; Jayaram, Kassiri, and Yuan San, 2017).

By 2015 i.e. before the beginning of fiscal consolidation and relatively lower growth in
China, estimates of total investment outlays in Africa reached some US$500 billion. 9
Thus, while Chinese investment in Africa in 2000 equalled some 2% of that of the US, it
was some 51% of the US in 2015, with projections suggesting parity by 2020. In other
words, Chinese investment in Africa, whatever the disclaimers, is not inconsequential.

By now, the charges leveled against increased Chinese presence in Africa, especially in
the business sector, have been repeated so frequently that they have become almost
stylized facts (Sanghi and Johnson 2016;) i.e. Chinese investment is not benefitting
Africans; China prefers to deal with “captured” African governments and avoids
interaction with a critical civil society; China extracts Africa’s natural resources with
little concern for environmental impact; China bankrolls Chinese entrepreneurs at the
9

See Chinese investment in Africa: which sectors get the most? | World Economic Forum (weforum.org)

12

detriment of local firms; and that China is exporting labor to Africa, while it has little
sympathy for labor rights at home and in host countries.

In a study of Chinese investment in Uganda, Van Dijk and Warmerdam (2012)
interrogated some 49 Chinese companies about some of these charges, while Men
(2019) looked at similar issues in a case study of Tanzania and Niikondo and Coetzee
(2009) and Tityende (2015) that of Namibia. The studies’ results were equivocal on one
of the oft-repeated charges i.e. that Chinese policy tends to conflate aid, trade, and
private investment in Africa. The studies show that the Chinese state machinery
expends little effort in supporting Chinese entrepreneurs at the lower levels of the
business sector in Africa, nor does it solicit host governments on their behalf. However,
it encourages them to establish trade associations that can project and defend their
interests in the host country (Li 2010).
Still, this has not prevented local political opposition groups from going into overdrive
in their claims of Chinese “takeover” 10, often requiring push back from local Chinese
trade associations or embassies in host countries (Spring and Jiao 2008).

There is evidence that Chinese entry is beginning to elicit structural changes in Africa’s
informal economies, forcing local entrepreneurs to do things differently (Feng and
Pilling 2019; Ross, Omar, and Xu 2019). Some studies suggest that Chinese presence and
its disruptive potential has been beneficial for African business, while others argue that
it has promoted technological adoption in some sectors, notably irrigation systems in
agriculture and aspects of manufacturing and marketing (Weng et. al. 2018; Xia 2019).

Although the learning curve has been steep, many local entrepreneurs are beginning to
compete favorably with Chinese counterparts (Onjuni and Fee 2019). Many now order
goods directly from China or other parts of Asia and are skipping local Chinese
middlemen altogether (Dankwah and Valenta 2019). Moreover, many African traders
have learnt some Mandarin and travel to China for the best deals. They have small
enclaves of their own in Hong Kong and mainland China, in a form of the Empire Strikes
Back (Lyons, Brown and Zhigang 2012; Matthews and Yang 2012).
Studies also indicate that given a choice, Chinese entrepreneurs prefer good economic
environments, with efficient bureaucratic systems, to those where corruption is rife i.e.,
they want to be left alone to focus on their businesses (Brautigam 2003).
A study of Ghana (Dankwah and Valenta 2019) indicates that Chinese entrepreneurs
there have had to adjust to complex business relationships, involving at least three
Ghanaian groups. The first group includes Ghanaian traders with own capital, who,
though the main competitors of the Chinese, nevertheless are forced to seek favors from
them owing to language constraints or difficulty of getting visas to China.

The second group comprises petty traders, who are totally “collaborative” as they get
their goods directly from Chinese wholesalers, often on credit. To this group also

10
Newspapers, notably in Zambia, Cameroon and Kenya have highlighted (seemingly rare) cases of chicken
raising, maize roasting in markets and selling of vegetables on the roadside as examples of this “takeover.”
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belongs Ghanaians who provide services to Chinese firms or rent them properties.

The third category is competitive and even confrontational. It includes the Ghanaian
Union of Traders, who seek to pursue the interests of their members in every way
possible.
These examples indicate that contrary to media reports, Chinese firms are not able to
run roughshod over domestic business interests and often must negotiate their way
carefully through the host country’s political minefields.

In responding to the “space wars” above, African policymakers will need to choose
between the pursuit of a laissez faire approach, which allows foreign investors to enter
virtually all sectors of the economy without hinderance or one which is carefully
calibrated to maximize opportunities for local entrepreneurs, by restricting foreign
entry in certain sectors, such as the low-tech retail and service industries, while keeping
an eye on employment and consumer welfare. The latter approach, and not laissez faire,
was incidentally the one that China used in earlier phases of its industrialization.
IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, the presence of Chinese entrepreneurs in the lower rungs of Africa’s
business sector has had real impacts on local livelihoods and the host economies.
However, contrary to the often-hysterical depictions in the media, impacts are not
always negative. Yes, many local entrepreneurs have been outcompeted by the superior
networks and better financing of the Chinese businesses, but many local entrepreneurs
have devised coping mechanisms of their own, including strengthening their own
networks, cutting out middlemen, and even learning Mandarin. Above all, studies attest
to better supply of goods and services as well as increased local employment caused by
Chinese entry.
This has not meant the absence of friction and discontent in many countries and
communities as Chinese communities negotiate their way into African economies. The
economic environment and political economy of countries have been key determinants
of the nature of local responses.

Many studies show that there is serious resentment attached to the perceived
underhandedness of Chinese business dealings, including insufficient concern for the
environment, poor labor rights, and even incidences of racial insults (Goldstein 2018).
Some studies dismiss some of the latter as isolated “teething” problems and the fact that
reputational challenges arise from the many small Chinese companies, “answerable to
no one back home”, that are operating in Africa today.
Finally, many studies have highlighted the tension between China’s win-win approach
to Africa and the market imperatives of running successful businesses. While the PRC
has been able to straddle the two stances in recent years, the accumulation of African
debt across the board shows that a more stringent, and results-oriented approach i.e., a
calibration of Africa-China relations to ensure sustainability, will need to be pursued in
14

the future.

It seems that Chinese entrepreneurs are ahead of the game between and within
countries. Already, Chinese businesses are drifting toward more stable and better run
African economies i.e., Kenya and Senegal, and toward more technically oriented sectors
of the economies where their activities have better returns and a more predictable
horizon i.e., they are behaving like business entities elsewhere in the world.
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